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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utal1
FRIENDSHIP MANOR CORPORATION,
a Utah Non-Profit and
Charitable Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

THE TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH; EARL M. BAKER, Salt Lake
County Assessor; SID LAMBOURNE,
Salt Lake County Treasurer; and ROYAL
K. HUNT, OSCAR HANSON, JR., and
PHILLIP BLOMQUIST, Commissioners
of Salt Lake County, Utah; GLEN
PALMER, Salt Lake County Auditor,
Defendants and Appellants.

CASE NO.
12145

A/7''1=1. t../I A/ Is

BRIEF OF itESPOPtBENT
NATURE OF.,THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment made and
entered on the 14th day of May, 1970, by the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, one of the Judges of the
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah!
determining that the real property and improve:.
ments thereon, known as Friendship Manor, at
fifth South on Thirteenth East in Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, was used· exclusive-

2.

ly for· charitable purposes within the meaning oi
Article XIII, Utah Constitution, and Section 59-2-1
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and therefore exempt
from taxes on tangible property, with the exception of that portion of the Friendship Manor occu- ,
pied solely by tenants who are under 62 years of
age, who are not handicapped, and who are not
employed by plaintiff-respondent to assist in management (Tr. 304, 305).

DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT
The Trial Court, in its Judgment and Decree
(Tr. 304, 305), ordered, adjudged and decreed as
follows:
"l. That the Salt Lake County Assessor
of the Salt Lake County Commission sitting as
a Board of Equalization enter upon the tax
assessment rolls of Salt Lake County the lot
and building of the plaintiff located at 5th
South and 13th East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and more particularly described as follows:

Beginning at the Northeast comer of
Lot 5, Block 16, Plat "F", Salt Lake
City Survey and running thence East
247.50 feet; thence South 165.00 feet;
thence East 49.50 feet; thence South
330.00 feet; thence West 132.00 feet;
thence North 181.50 feet; thence West
165.00 feet; thence North 313.50 feet to
the point of beginning.
"2. That plaintiff's lot and building referred to in Paragraph 1 hereof, except those
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apartments occupied solely by tenants who are
under 62 years of age, who are not handicapped, and who are not employed by plaintiff to assist in management or operation of
Friendship Manor, is used exclusively for
charitable purposes within the meaning of
Article XIII, Utah Constitution, and 59-2-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and therefore
exempt from the tax on tangible property.
"3. That the said defendants tax plaintiff's said property for 1968, 1969, and subsequent years by assessing only those apartments
that are occupied solely by persons who are
under 62 years of age, not handicapped, and
not employed by plaintiff to assist in the management or operation of Friendship Manor, as
of January 1, of each tax year."

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendants-Appellants seek review and reversal of the Trial Court's Judgment and Decree,
and the
thereof, and that the case be remanded back to the Trial Court, directing said
Court to make and enter its Judgment and Decree
that the said Friendship Manor is not being used
exclusively for charitable purposes as that term is
defined by Article XIII, Section 2, Constitution of
Utah, and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
and that the Assessor of Salt Lake County be directed to enter the same on the tax rolls of Salt Lake
County, and that the same be taxed for the years
1968, 1969 and subsequent years, without any exceptions.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material part of the Constitution of the
state of Utah pertinent to the issue before his Honorable Court is Article XIII, Section 2, which provides as follows:
"All tangible property in the state, not
exempt under the laws of the United States, or
under this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The property of the state,
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries, lots
with the buildings thereon used exclusively for
either religious worship or charitable purposes,
* * * shall be exempt from taxation. * * * "
(Emphasis ours)

Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides as follows:
"The property of the United States, of this
state, counties, cities, towns, school districts,
municipal corporations and public libraries,
lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively
for e i t h e r religious worship or charitable
purposes, * * * shall be exempt from taxation."
(Emphasis ours)

The plaintiff-respondent, Friendship Manor
Corporation, is a non-profit corporation organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
state of Utah, its Articles of Incorporation having
been filed in the office of the Secretary of State of
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the state of Utah on the 8th day of October, 1965

(Tr. 6).

The purposes for which the corporation was
formed are set forth in Article II, called the restated
Articles of Incorporation of Friendship Manor Corporation, (Tr. 6)
The incorporators were ten citizens residing in
Salt Lake County, state of Utah (Tr. 8).
Plaintiff-respondent made and executed its
certain Mortgage Note (Exhibit D-25) under date of
November 22, 1965, in the principal amount of $3,317 ,600.00, payable to Federation Bank and Trust
Company in monthly installments. To secure the
payment of said Mortgage Note a Mortgage (Exhibit D-26) of even date therewith, was made and
executed by plaintiff-respondent as Mortgagor, and
Federation Bank and Trust Company as Mortgagee,
which instrument consitutes a first mortgage on the
property herein involved.
The moneys received from the disbursements
of the loan paid for the cost of the land, the buildings erected thereon and equipment, including for
illustration the knives and forks and various other
utilities (Tr. 391).
Richard K. Nelson, auditor for the plaintiffrespondent, was asked the following question:
"Q Now, Mr. Nelson, is it not a fact that
under the Federal Housing Administration
provisions it was necessary to have set
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up as capital outlay $25,000 as money contributed by the sponsors in order to obtain the loan, was it not?" (Tr. 456, 457)

His answer was in the affirmative, and that was one
of the requisites (Tr. 457). Further, that the capital
which was put into the corporation as required
by the Federal Housing Administration was given
to the plaintiff..respondent herein by Chuckrow
Construction Company (Chuckrow Construction
Company was awarded the contract to construct
the building without bids (Tr. 368) by virtue of a
promissory note (Tr. 457). Exhibit D-15 was introduced and received into evidence. Exhibit D-15 is
a Promissory Note executed by .Friendship Manor
Corporation, plaintiff-respondent herein, on the
________ day of November, 1965, payable to Robert
Chuckrow Construction Company, Inc. in the principal sum of $25,000.00, payable, in whole or in
part, either as to principal or interest, prior to
November 22, 2005. The maturity date of the note and
mortgage insured by the Federal Housing Com
missioner, and covering FHA Project No. 10538002-NP. Said Promissory Note provided in paragraph (3) thereof that this note represents an advance of funds by Robert Chuckrow Construction
Co., Inc. to the nonprofit mortgagor for an operating deficit fund as required by · Item 10 of the
Commitment issued November 22, 1965, in connection with the Friendship Manor Project (Tr. 457).
Said Promissory Note, paragraph (4) provided
that the maker of the note understood that the
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Federal Housing Administration requires .that this
be a bona fide loan transaction with the intent that
the note be paid from any residual receipts of the
maker; that for the purposes of the note the term
"residual receipts" means such money as may remain after provision for: (a) The payment of all
amounts due or required to be paid under the
terms of any mortgage insured or held by the Commissioner; (b) All amounts due to the Reserve for
Replacements Fund; (c) Funds for the payment of
all operating and maintenance expenses, security
deposits held, taxes, assessments, fixed charges
due or accrued, insurance; and (d) Liabilities currently due and arising as a result of necessary expenditures incident to the normal operation of the
project.
Mr. Nelson testified further (Tr. 457, 458) that
there were a number of gifts totaling about $1700.00.
There was paid by Mr. Nelson, the auditor, $500.00,
and by Mr. Stewart, the attorney, $300.00.
There is no evidence that the sponsoring
churches made a contribution of any amount whatsoever. The evidence shows that tenants who occupied the Friendship Manor had to meet certain
requirements. The tenants must be ambulatory;
they must be financially able to maintain or pay
their rent as well as take care of themselves. The
Friendship Manor is not in a position to accept
tenants if they are not financially responsible to
pay the expenses and maintain the standard of living which is required in the Friendship Manor.
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The tenants must be of the age of 62 years or over. Under

the FHA regulations twenty percent of the total
number of apartments or rooms may be rented to
people who may be under the age of 62 years (Tr.
377, 378).
Reverend Blish, who was the first manager of
Friendship Manor, testified that the person's financial condition as an applicant for rental space was
inquired into by him. That the main objective in discussing rental and the financial condition of the applicant was for the purpose of determining whether
or not he would be able to pay the rental of the
apartment he was making application for (Tr. 369).
That the applicant upon being accepted for tenancy
was required to pay the first and last months' rental in advance (Tr. 369, 370). Further, that the tenant
was required also to put up the cost of one meal
over a 30-day calendar month in advance. If he
were going to eat just breakfast, it would be $20 a
month, lunch would be $27 a month, and dinner
would be $35 a month (Tr. 370, 371).
Reverend Blish further testified that with respect to the rental units, some have balconies and
some do not. That an extra charge was made for
those who had a balcony. That the rental unit has
an extra charge of $10 for a balcony (Tr. 372, 373).
Reverend Blish further testified that the charge for
rental varies in accordance with the height of the
apartment. He testified the basic rent schedule
starts on the second floor, and that an apartment
of $100 is $100 on the second floor. Each floor ad·
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vances $1.00 per floor as it goes up for the unit over .
the basic rent figure. In other words, a dollar extra
for each floor after the second floor. That is, the
third floor would be $1.00 extra; the fourth floor
would be $2.00 extra; and so on up. In addition to
the extra dollar per flight over the basic rent, there
would be $10.00 extra paid for a balcony (Tr. 373).
The extra dollar does not apply to apartments under
rent supplement (Tr. 373).
The top floor of the Friendship Manor has five
one-bedroom apartments and three two-bedroom
apartments, and they are called penthouse apartments (Tr. 374, 375).
The following question was propounded to
Reverend Blish:
Q Now Reverend, * * * In considering applicants for admission or for rental of units, the
mere fact that they may have say for illustration $10,000 a year income is not taken into
consideration for or against them, is it, Reverend?

A No, Sir. It's their physical need that is
taken into consideration.

Q Yes. In other words, the wealthy or those
of incomes of ten or twenty thousand dollars
a year are not discriminated against by virtue
of that income over an individual who may
only have an income of two thousand a year.
Isn't that correct?
A That is correct. (Tr. 375)

He testified further that they have no policy
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or regulation that limits tenancy to any particular
class of people as it pertains to their financial worth
or their financial income; only as respects rent
supplement program (Tr. 375). Rent supplement
program, as explained, is that if a person qualifies
for rent supplement using $100 rental unit as an
illustration, the government will put up 70% or $70
and the tenant will put up $30 a month. However,
as £ar as Friendship Manor is concerned, they made
no contribution to the rent supplement. Rent suppleis a program of the United States Government in
which they supplement to certain people, if they
come within the definition of "need of assistance"
(Tr. 376).
Reverend Blish further testified that the tenant
must be ambulatory; that he must be financially
able to maintain or pay his rent, as well as to take
care of himself (Tr. 377). That Friendship Manor is
not in a position to accept tenants if they are not
in a position to pay the obligations and maintain
the standard of living which is required in the
Manor. He was asked whether or not this was correct, and he answered that it was essentially correct (Tr. 378).
Under FHA regulations, 20% of the total numof apartments may be rented to people under 62
years of age (Tr. 378).
tion:

Reverend Blish was asked the following quesQ Now, I think also, Reverend, you have

previously testified that the tenants must be
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in sound enough mind so that they are not in
any dangers of themselves or dangers to anyone else in the place. Isn't that correct?"
A That is correct. (Tr. 380)

tion:

Reverend Blish was asked the following quesQ Okeh. Let me give this to you, Reverend.
This will be on page 66. The question there,
Reverend, which was propounded to you was,
question, "That's right; and so frankly as I
say in these two or three you have had when
they are unable to pay because of some reason,
the income has stopped, you call the next of
kin?"

A That's right.
Answer, "That's right. Tell them the situation and talk with them about the problem.
If they don't want to pay it, they are asked to
leave." Is that correct? (Tr. 379)

Q

A Well, I think that that is essentially correct that they might be asked to leave, but to
my knowledge there is no one ever been asked
to leave.
And the only reason they haven't been is
because they have either made arrangements to
pay themselves or had others pay it for them?
Q

A This is correct. (Tr. 380)

tion:

Reverend Blish was asked the following quesQ It's also true, is it not, Reverend, when
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tenants come to the time when they need more
concentrated type of care, then you advise the
next of kin or that they must go elsewhere to
receive better care, is it not?
A

This is correct. (Tr. 381)

Reverend Blish testified that Friendship Manor
was never intended to be a rest home or convalescent home. He was asked the following question:
Q In others words, if a person only has strictly a welfare payment income, they are not
acceptable or do not qualify?

A

They wouldn't be able to qualify. (Tr. 381)

In the instances that one or two tenants have
been on welfare they have met the requirements
because the Welfare Department has supplemented
or the family has, so that the rental basic minimums
are paid (Tr. 381 ).
The rental unit which is furnished is increased
in rent $20.00 per month for the furniture. This
$20.00 per month is arrived at so that Friendship
Manor could amortize the cost of furniture over a
period of eighteen months (Tr. 382), so that the
tenant is paying for the furniture by the excess
rental.
Mr. Roe, counsel for plaintiff-respondent,
Friendship Manor Corporation, stated (Tr. 383):
"I don't think there is any issue-any
factual issue as to whether the people at
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Friendship Manor have to pay rent or not.
We will admit that they have to pay rent, the
rents are fixed by Friendship Manor, one way
or another."

All help in the operation or maintenance of
Friendship Manor, including office help is paid (Tr.
384). There is no evidence of any jointly or nonpaid help in the operation or maintenance of
Friendship Manor, including office help.
Friendship Manor rented space in the building for a beauty shop to a private individual, the
rent being $150.00 per month (Tr. 385, 386). A sundry
shop was rented to an individual for $75.00 per
month (Tr. 386, 387). An office was rented to a doctor
for $100.00 per month (Tr. 387).
The rental base of the units, that is, the apartments and rooms, was computed on having approximately a 93 percent occupancy, and if they obtained the required occupancy, that this total
amount of rental equalled enough to pay all expenses of maintenance, interest on the mortgage,
principal payments or amortization (Tr. 388).
A restaurant is operated by Friendship Manor,
the tenants being required to eat one meal there
a day (Tr. 389).

Mr. Nelson, the auditor, testified (Tr. 477) that
the building is being paid by the payments on the
mortgage and that at the end of the payment of the
note, the building is paid and the land is also free
and clear.
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Mrs. Zwick, the present superintendent or nanager of Friendship Manor, testified (Tr. 496, 497) that
the amount of rent scheduled for collection is for
the purpose of meeting all expenses, amortization of
interest, and principal. Further, that if for any reason
was an increase in the cost of the operation
such as taxes, that this would have to be met by
increasing the rentals.
Certain tenants were subpoenaed for the purpose of showing the amount paid as rental, their
ages and their incomes.
Lois Winger testified that she was a tenant renting a studio apartment and her rent is $81.00 a
month. She is on the third floor; she is employed
by the Department of Agriculture, and her age is
59. Her duties at the Department of Agriculture are
as a cardographic engineering aid; her income is
about $7,000.00 a year (Tr. 541, 542).
Ruth Gates testified under subpoena that she
has an efficiency apartment; her monthly rental is
$117.00 per month; she is sixty years of age. She
employed by the Granite School District and is
engaged in special education, teaching children
with learning disabilities, and that her salary is
$9,000.00 a year. Mrs. Gates testified that she went
to the Friendship Manor because she had been in
a.n apartment-house where there was a lot of trouble
and she wanted to get someplace where she could
feel secure (Tr. 543, 544).
William Bird Huffine was a tenant who testified by virtue of a subpoena. He rents a studio

15
apartment, his rent being $82.00 per month plus
$22.00 for furniture. He was 58 years of age when
he came to Friendship Manor and that he is now
60. He is employed by the State Highway Department as a transportation engineer; that his gross
salary is $965.00 per month (Tr. 560, 561). He further testified, however, that by order of the court
he has to pay one-half of his salary to his divorced
wife.
Emery Westlake testified under subpoena that
he was 44 years of age and that he rents a studio
apartment for the rental of $104.00 per month; that
he is on the sixth floor and has lived in Friendship
Manor for two years; that he is employed by Edo
Western Corporation as a reliability engineer, electrical. That his hourly rate is $5.50 an hour and that
his gross income would be at least $5,000.00 a year
(Tr. 562, 563).
Rita Haggerman testified under subpoena that
she rents an efficiency apartment and pays $126.00
per month; that she is on the eighth floor. Her age
is 75 and she has an income of at least $5,000.00 a
year, or more (Tr. 563, 564).
Kathryn W. Hornberger testified by virtueof
a subpoena that she rents a one bedroom with
balcony and kitchenette; that her rent is $140.00 per
month. Her income is $4800.00 per year (Tr. 565,
566).
R. 0. Porter testified by virtue of subpoena
that he has an ap.::irtmef'.t consisting of two bed-
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rooms and a veranda and the rent is $175.00 per
month. He is on the twelfth floor; he is over 62 years
of age; is a physician; that his income is in excess
of $5,000.00 a year (Tr. 567, 568).
Amy Dannevik testi£ied that she has a one bedroom apartment with a living room and a kitchenette. Her rent is $134.00 a month and she resides on
sixth floor and that she has a balcony, for which
she pays $10.00 a month extra, and $1.00 a month extra for each floor, which would mean that she had to
pay $10.00 for the balcony and $6.00 extra because
of being on the sixth floor. She is retired and is over
the age of 62. She was a comptometer operator
prior to her retirement. From the testimony it could
be fairly stated that her calendar income was approximately $5,000.00 (Tr. 570).
R. E. Edmundson was called by a subpoena.

He has a single bedroom apartment; his rent is
$131.00 per month; he is on the thirteenth floor.
The reason for the $131.00 is because he is on a
higher floor; that he has been there since August,
1967. He testified that his income was over $5,000.00.
He is over the age of 62 (Tr. 571, 572).
Erma Hance testified by result of a subpoena.
She occupies a living room and two bedrooms. Her
rent is $172.00 per month and she is on the ninth
floor and has a balcony. She pays extra rent to have
a balcony with a view, and that it was her desire
to have a balcony as she desired the view of the
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county. That her income is about $11,000.00 a year
(Tr. 584, 585).
Mrs. Zwick testified that a Mrs. Brown occupied
c1 penthouse, room 1409. That her rental per month
is $175.00. That she does not remember the amount
shown in her financial statement as to the eT:i.ct
amount of her income, but that Mrs. Brown is v.rhat
one would call economically affluent (Tr. 583, 534).
The defendant subpoenaed June E. Brown, the
administrator of the Newhouse Hotel, located at
Fourth South and Main Street. She testified that she
acted as administrator since February 1, 1959. She
testified that her duty as manager of the Newhouse
Hotel is to manage the Hotel, as well as the senior
citizens' portion of the Hotel. She oversees the whole
project. She has the knowledge of all facilities offered for senior citizens by the Hotel. Their rentals
start at $190.00 per month (Tr. 545, 546). These
rentals consist of three meals a day, weekly maid
service, weekly linen service, 24-hour switchboard
service, and 24-hour nursing service. This minimum
rental of $190.00 would be a one room with bath,
including all of the meals. That it is the program
to require that persons living there take three meals
a day, the reason for this being the getting together,
eating three meals, firstly, for the better health of
the elderly and, secondly, for the congeniality of
seeing people and not being alone. However, this
is not a requirement, and a person can get a rcom
under the senior citizens' program without taking
meals. In the event they do not take their meals,
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the rental would be $125.00. Anyone who did not
want to take meals would have all the facilities that
are offered for senior citizens. They rent their rooms
either furnished or unfurnished. She further testified that there is no price differential because of the
floor level; that is, there is not a price differential
by the height. They have a nurse on call 24 hours
a day (Tr. 547, 548).
They do not require a financial statement; however, they do make inquiry as to the physical condition of the persons moving in, so that they will
know when they become ill whether they have
diabetes or what their ailment might be. There is
no lease agreement required and they do not require a deposit for the first and last months' rent
(Tr. 549, 550).

'

There are self-service elevators in the Hotel:
they have a handbar that goes the circumference
of the elevator. Also, a telephone in case of emergency. The doors on the floor to the elevator are set
for fourteen seconds. This is slower than normal
(Tr. 550, 551). Tenants have to be ambulatory. A
tenant can contact the nurse or someone in case
of emergency by use of the house telephone. They
only have to knock this off and either the nurse or
administrator will be there in seconds. They give
to the tenants a special instruction regarding this
procedure. They also furnish movies every Friday ·
night; travelogues. They will have a regular dinner- ,
birthday cake, and entertainment. They have a ·
1
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pool room, a sewing room, library books, and
have bridge, which are available to the elderly
tenants (Tr. 550, 551).
Mrs. Brown further testified that she was able
to observe a marked change in appearance and attitude of the tenants. That after they have eaten one
meal a day the added meals and the friendship ot
the other ladies tends to put more sparkle into their
eye and they take more zest for living. Further, she
has found that one tenant will help another. That
the Newhouse Hotel is subject to real property tax
(Tr. 552, 553). She further testified that people have
to be ambulatory, but anyone using a walker would
be accepted (Tr. 554, 555). She further testified that
part of, the Hotel is now being used for a transient
type of person and part for elderly citizens, and
that it is her intention, if they can get more elderly
persons, that they would do away with the hotel
pa.rt. That a good deal of the present hotel business is a part of previous commitments (Tr. 555).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
FRIENDSHIP MANOR WAS NOT BEING USED
EXCLUSIVELY FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES TO
QUALIFY IT FOR EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION
UNDER AND BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND
SECTION 59-2-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS
AMENDED.
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The sole question to be resolved in this case is
whether the buildinq and premises of Friendship
Manor have been used exclusively for charitable
purposes, as shown by the facts adduced in this
case, under and by virtue of Section 59-2-1, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
We emphatically contend that the owner,
Friendship Manor, has not met the burden required of it to show tha_t Friendship Manor is exempt from taxation and, therefore, an exception to
the general rule that all property of whatever kind
soever and by whomsoever owned is subject to
taxation. An exemption must not be aided by judicial interpretation. The rule of strict construction
applies. All doubts must be resolved against the
exemption. See Parker v. Quinn, 64 P 961, 23 Utah 332.
We feel in order to be of assistance to this Honorable Court we should review all Ut0.h cases in
the interpretation of Article XIII, Section 2 of the
Constitution of the Sta:te of Utah, and Section 59-2-l,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, a.s mnended.
The first Utah case is that of Parker v. Quinn, 64
P 961, 23 Utah 332. The facts in this case are as follows:
" * * * it appears that the plaintiffs, as
trustees, held the legal title to certain premises situate in Sa!t Lake City, for the Fifteenth
Ward Relid Society, cr:_:ani=ed and acting
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exclusively for charitable purposes,-ministering to the poor, sick, and destitute members
of the community. Upon the premises there is
a two-story brick building, the upper floor of
which has been used continuously by the relief society for the holding of meetings and the
performance of work by its members in furtherance of its charitable purposes. The lower
floor contains two store-rooms, one of which
is rented for $12.50 per month, and the other
is being offered for the same rent, but at
present is vacant. All the rental so received
is used for charitable purposes, and forms a
part of the sums disbursed annually by the
society, and all the members of the society
serve as such without remuneration. * * * "

The Court held that where a portion of certain
property owned by a charitable institution is occupied and used by it for charitable purposes, and
the remaining portion thereof is devoted to purposes
of revenue, the portion used and occupied for
charitable purposes is exempt, and the portion not
so used and occupied is subject to taxation.
The Supreme Court of Utah stated as follows:
" * * * The general rule is that all property of what kind soever, and by whomsoever
owned, is subject to taxation; and, when any
kind of property is exempt, it constitutes an
exception to this rule. The reason of the rule
is that it is just and equitable that every
species of property within the state should bear
its equal proportion of the burdens of the government. When, therefore, an owner claims that
certain property is exempt from taxation, the
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burden is upon him to show that it falls within the exception. And an exe11iption will not
be aided by judicial interpretation. * * * In such
cases the rule of strict construction applies, and,
in order to relieve any species of property from
its due and just proportion of the burdens of
the government, the language relied on as creating the exemption should be so clear as not to
admit of reasonable controversy about its meaning; for all doubts must be resolved against the
exemption. The power to tax rests upon necessity, and is essential to the existence of the
state." (Emphasis ours)

" ':' * * The exemptions thus expressly
granted, as we have seen, form an exception
to the general rule that every species of property within the state is liable to bear its just
proportion of the public burden. Any property
falling within the exception is released from
this burden, and such release is justified on the
theory, that the state derives some peculiar benefit-whatever that niay be-from such property.
* * * " (Emphasis ours)

The next Utah case is that of Salt Lake Lodge No. 85,
B.P.O.E. v. Groesbeck, 120 P 192. The taxpayer was a
fraternal order whose object was good fellowship
among its members, to carry out charitable purposes
and conduct a social club for the benefit of the members, owned a
to which members only
were admitted. Part of the clubhouse was used as
a buffet and dining room wherein meals, cigars,
and drinks were served to members at customary
prices, the net proceeds therefrom being devoted
to charitable purposes, and the rest of the clubhouse
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was used for social purposes. The Court held th."'t
the primary purpose of the order being charitable
and its charities not being restricted to its own members, the clubhouse was exempt, under Const. art.
J 3, Sec. 3, providing that property used exclusively
for charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation, the use of part of the clubhouse as a buffet
;1nd cc:de being only incidental to the charitable purpose of the order. There was a strong dissent in this
case by Frick, C. J.
One of the significant statements enunciated by
the Court was to the effect that the statute, in exempting property used exclusively for charitable
purposes, is to encourage the promotion of institutions and organizations having for their objc:ct the
care and maintenance of the indigent and destitute
citizen, the helpless orphan and the poor who are
sick and afflicted, and whose charity and ministrations in many respects correspondingly relie1Jes the
1falc of such burdens. This case again enunciates the rule that
all property is taxable and that the burden of showing that
J1articular jnoperty is exempt from taxation is upon the person claiming the exemption.

We call the Court's attention to the case of Odd
Fellows' Bldg. Ass'n v. Naylor, 177 P 214. This is a case in
which a building owned by a charitable association
v,ras in part rented out to stores, the inc::ime being
used only to keep the building in repair and for
charitable and benevolent purposes. The Court
held that the part of the building rented out to stores
was not exempt f; :,m
A very significant
1
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satement was made in this case in which the Court
states that it must be conceded that the owners of
propery, to be exempt within the purview of the
Consitution, are not limited to ecclesiastical or charitable organizations, but the exemption privilege is
exten_ded to the class of property mentioned, without regard to the character of its owner. The owner
may . be a church organization, a charitable or fraternal organization, or it may be a private individual
or a corporation.
The foregoing are the only Utah cases we find
where there has been previously before this Honorable Court a factual situation for the determination of whether or not Article XIII, Utah Constitution, Section 2, and Section 59-2-1, UCA 1953, have
been applied pertaining to the question of whether
the property is being used exclusively for charitable
purposes.
It has only been of recent years that cases have
been presented to the courts of last resort on facts
similar to the one before this Honorable Court. It
is our purpose to review these cases.

1n the case of Mountain View Homes, Inc. v. State
Tax Commission, 427 P2d 13, the case before the Supreme Court of New Mexico was a question of the
exemption of a multi-housing family complex in
Albuquerque containing 316 units ranging in size
from efficiency apartments to three
two baths renting for $105.00 per month. The proJ-
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ect was financed and is administered under
§ 22 l(d)(3) of the National Housing Act, as amended.
The maximum income for tenants occupying the
dwellings is regulated and controlled under the
provisions of the National Housing Act, as amended.
The sponsor of the multi-housing complex was a
non-profit corporation organized under the laws of
New Mexico to provide dwelling accommodations
for moderate and low-income families and for families displaced by urban renewal areas. Its articles
of incorporation prohibited distribution of any of its
earnings to the benefit of any stockholder, individual, member or officer of the corporation.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico made certain observations which we think are pertinent and
are quoted below:
"A benefit is thus bestowed. However, the

recipients are certainly in no sense sick. or indigent, and we would venture that most would
be surprised to learn that they are considered as
being proper objects for, or as recipients of
charity. * * * " (Emphasis ours)

It is inconceivable that tenants of Friendship
Manor considered themselves objects of charity;
particularly those tenants whose testimonies are set
forth in the Statement of Facts.
The Court further stated:
" * * * It is clear that rents are fixed at an
amount necessary to pay the interest, amortize
the principal and pay all expenses of maintain-
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ing the property. By what theory this should
not include faxes on the same basis as other
comparable properties is not clear to us.
That the federal government does not tax the
income derived from the property is in no way
persuasive. Here, we have an enterprise to
furnish low-cost housing to a certain segment
of our population. It was intended to be selfsupporting, without any thought that gifts or
charity were involved. The tenants are required
to pay for the premises occupied by them with
the rentals being fixed so as to return the
amount estimated as being necessary to pay
out the project. It is competitive with landlords
offering other residential property for rent and
on which taxes must be paid. Also, as the State
Tax Commission found, there was no evidence
that the public is relieved of any expense in
comparison with the loss of tax revenue. Compare Berger v. University of New Mexico, 28
666, 217 P 245 (1923). We conclud') the
use is not charitable so as to exempt the property from taxes under Article VIII, § 3, N.M.
Const." (Emphasis ours)

The Newhouse Hotel is competitive, yet must
pay real property taxes.
Article VIII, § 3 of the New Mexico Constitution
provides for exemptions from taxation which included property used for charitable purposes. It
did not include "exclusively for charitable pur-:)OSC::!s", as that term is incorporated in the Constitution of Utah.
We think that the following case is very pertinent to the issues before this Court, namely,

27
U11ited PresbyteriC?n Ass'n v. Board of County" Co111111issioners,

448 P2d 967. The Association claiming tax exemption under the Colorado law was the United Presbyterian Association, incorporated in Colorado as a
nonprofit corporation. Its formation was sponsored
by three Denver area churches, each of which
designated three trustees to constitute the BoJ.rd
of the Association. The Association's articles of incorporation declare the following corporate purposes:
"To provide elderly persons on a nonprofit basis, with housing facilities and services, specially designed to meet the physical,
social and psychological needs of the aged, and
contribute to their health, security, happiness
and usefulness in longer living."

The Association built Highland West, a 12-story
apartment house containing 121 units, ranging in
size from buffet apartments to two-bedroom 0partments. The building has special construction features designed for the elderly; ramps in lieu of
steps, wide doors to accommodate wheelchairs,
grab bars at strategic locations, an electronic alarm
system connecting each apartment with the resident manager's office, and elevators of a siz·2 to
admit stretchers. The building also has a lounge,
recreation room, and enclosed roof deck for common use by the tenants, as well as two kitchens for
group use. The total cost of Highland VIest was
$1,552,354.11, of which $176,712.32 is attributable
to land acquisition cost.
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The building was financed by funds derived
from a loan in the sum of $1,554,790 obtained from
a private mortgage company and insured by the
Federal Housing Administration under Section 231
of the National Housing Act, a comparable situation as the case before this Court. The Federal Housing Administration required the three sponsoring
churches to advance $90,000 to the Association,
which was done in the following manner: $45,000
loan from the Denver Presbytery, secured by a conveyance of Association property worth $20,000, subject to repurchase; and, $30,000 and $15,000 loans
from the other two churches respectively. All loans
are non-interest bearing. In addition, the Federal
P0using Administration required establishment of
a $32,000 trust fund, and the money, therefor came
from tenants' occupancy fees.
The factual situation as to the organization and
the type of operation and the source of the funds
is comparable with the case before this Honorable
There
however, one distinguishing fact
situation thqt is dif£erent, and that is in this Colorado case the sponsoring churches had to advance
$90,000, whereas in the case before this Court the
sponsoring churches, as far as the evidence discloses, did not put up one dime. The $25,000 required to be put in as capital was loaned to them
by the contractor who constructed the premises
(Tr. 456).
0

Article X, § S of the Colorado Constitution, which
is pertinent, reads as follows:
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"Property, real and personal, that is used
solely and exclusively * * * for strictly char- .
itable purposes purposes * * '\ shall be exempt
from taxation, unless otherwise provided by
law."

The Colorado Court enunciated the fundamental doctrine that the established rule is that the
presumption is against · tax exemption, and the
burden is on the one claiming the ·exemption to
establish clearly his rights thereto.
In the Colorado case the rental schedules were
fixed in an amount necessary to pay interest and
amortize principal on the mortgage debt and maintain the property. In this case a tenant was required
to sign an agreement in which it was provided that
if the complex was not found to be tax exempt, the
monthly rentals would be increased in amounts
sufficient to pay the ad valorem tax.
Mrs. Zwick testified that if Friendship Manor
not tax exempt, then rentals would have to be
increased to meet the taxes levied and assessed
(Tr. 497).
In this Colorado case the sponsoring churches
sought to establish that the special facilities and
serivces provided by Highland West constituted a
charitable purpose which would support tax exemption. The Colorado Court felt a careful review
of the record disclosed that these special facilities
and services differed only in type, but not in nature,
from those provided by commercial multi-residential buildings. Thus, Highland West has ramps,
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safety rails, card recreation rooms and shuffleboard.
These are facilities of the same nature as small golf
courses, swimming pools, sauna baths, gyms, and
tennis courts provided by some commercial apartment houses for tenants who find these facilities
compatible with their needs and enjoyment. The
recreational services at Highland West, such as potluck suppers and scheduled card games, do not
differ inherently from the planned social activities
at a commercial resort.
The United Presbyterian Association was a nonprofit corporation operating Highland West on a
non-profit basis; but non-profit status cannot be
equated with charitableness. Rather, it is but one
factor which merits consideration in the determination of whether property is being used for strictly
charitable purposes.
The Supreme Court of Colorado felt the following factors weighed significantly against a charitable tax exemption. The amount and nature of the
fees and rentals which plaintiff required the elderly tenants to pay negated a charitable purpose. The
fact that charging fees wo11ld not necessarily remove plaintiff from the category of a charitable institution, ':'** the fact that it allocates living space
from the standpoint of desirability of location and
size on the basis of the amount of the *** "occupancy fee" seemed more related. Nothing in the
articles of incorporation or by-laws of the United
Presbyierian Association, or in the Agreement
which it enters into with tenants, imposes any obli-
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gation upon the Association to care for persons if
they become ill or without financial resources. The
total cost of Highland West was over one and a half
million dollars. One year's monthly rental income
was shown to be $124,312.67; a_nd, during that year,
a total of $96 was donated by the Association as
"rent adjustments." In the case before this Court,
there is no evidence of any rent adjustments by
Friendship Manor. The Colorado Court felt that
these factors refuted the contention that the subject property is used solely and exclusively for
charitable purposes by any reasonable intendment
of the statute of the state of Colorado.
As the Colorado Court aptly put it, is Highland
West performing what would otherwise be a governmental function? The justification for charitable
tax exemption, especially insofar as the rights of
the body politic are involved, is that if the charitable
work were not being done by a private party, it
would have to be undertaken at public expense.
The Colorado Court further stated that although
care for the aged is a proper concern of the government, governmental obligation does not extend to
the care of physically and financially independent
elderly persons who alone can qualify for admission to Highland West. It makes the significant
statement: "The furnishing of homes to older adults
is not in itself a charitable purpose."
The Court further stated that there must be
present benefit to the general public which is sufficient to justify the loss of tax revenue.
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We quote from page 975 of the Court's decision
as follows:
"The church organizations and their individual members, who sponsored incorporation
of plaintifi in error United Presbyterian Association for the purpose of building Highland
West, had a laudable purpose in building a fine
and suitable residence for senior citizens.
Equally commendable is the sponsors' desire
to provide a congenial environment for elderly persons, to plan social and recreational
activities compatible with their age and interests, and to enable them to attend services
of religious worship. But these are all activities
and services readily within the ability of any
organization or even inidviduals to perform.
As one court has characterized it, charity
should have 'spontaneity'-the generous giving
of one's talents and goods to those in need
thereof." (Emphasis ours)

If charity is the generous g1vmg of one's
talents and goods to those in need thereof as above
quoted, Friendship Manor does not qualify. They
are giving nothing. The tenants of Friendship
Manor are paying for all services rendered and
performed; if they do not pay, they must leave.

We refer this Honorable Court to the case of

Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Independent School District,

426 SW2d 943.
This is a similar factual situation to the one before the Court inasmuch as it was a home for the
elderly; that is, those of the age of sixty-two or over.
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However, in the Friendship Manor case before this
Court, a certain percentage of those under sixty-two
may be admitted.
In this case, the complex was financed with
funds guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration, the same situation as applies in the case
before the Court. The Hilltop Village complex was
composed of rooms that accommodated 133 persons, together with a cafeteria, chapel, library,
game lounge or social area, a laundry room, a canteen, mechanical rooms and administrative offices.
The Supreme Court of Texas made the comment that decisions denying exemption have emphasized that the occupants of the homes were the
principal beneficiaries rather than society in general, and that society was not relieved of responsibility for persons in need. It enunciated the rule
that all of the courts appear to pay homage to the
rule that tax exemption are subject to strict consrtuction since they are the antithesis of equality
and uniformity.
The Texas Court stated that the problem before

11 in this case was whether Hilltop Village was an

institution of purely public charity in its assumed
task of providing a home for the aged in the manner it had chosen so to do.
The Court made the following statement:
"The theory upon which institutions of
this character are exempted from taxation is
that they serve the government by relieving it

34
to some extent of what would otherwise be a
public duty or governmental function to care
for the indigent sick and afflicted, and it is
the assumption by such institutions of this
burden which compensates the government
for the exemption granted them from the general obligation resting upon all citizens to pay
taxes. * * * "
"River Oaks Garden Club v. City of
Houston, 370 SW2d 851 (Tex. Sup. 1963), is
our most recent writing upon the subject of
charitable exemption from taxation. In denying
exemption there, we reiterated the previously
stated tests:

"* * * [A/n organization is not an institution of purely public charity within the
meaning of the constitutional exemption unless
it assumes, to a material extent, that which
otherwise might become the obligation or duty
of the community or the state"; and "* * * *
unless its funds, property and assets are
pledged and used to provide for the basic needs
of the sick, distressed and needy, whether the
benefits be extended only to a small segment
of society or to the public generally."
"Hilltop Village is an institution providing special residental care for older citizens,
but its facilities are available primarily to those
who are able to pay. We have previously noted
that its admission policy is stated in its bylaws to be a matter of negotiation and mutual
agreement, with each case being considered on
its own merit. In contrast are the operating
facts emphasized by the Court in Santa Rosa
Infirmary."
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Further, at page 949, the Court made the following statement:
"We agree, contrary to the holding of the
intermediate court, that the activity of providing facilities to meet the special residential
requirements of the aged may qualify an institution for tax exemption as one of purely
public charity under circumstances where, in
the words of Article 7150, aid is dispensed
to those in sickness or distress 'without regard
to poverty or riches of the recipient' and 'the
funds, property and assets of such institution
are placed and bound by its laws to relieve,
aid and administer' to the relief of those in
want, sickness and distress. But it is apparent
that Hilltop Village is not accepting residents
without regard to their financial circumstances
nor is it bound to assume charitable obligations or to engage in dispensing relief to those
in need. The requisite elements of dedication
and use in fact of its properties are not present.
There is no assurance that society is being or
will be relieved of the care and expense of
those in need. This is not to say that all residents must be indigent or that the acceptance
of payment from some will defeat tax exemption. It is to say that the institution must be
one whose properties and assets are pledged
in perpetuity to the relief of persons in financial need and to their assistance in obtaining
the care they must have to prevent their becoming a burden on society. Laudable as it is
in origin and operation, Hilltop Village does
not meet the requirements of the Constitution and statutes of Texas for exemption from
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taxation as an institution of purely public
charity."

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, in
the case of The People v. The Association of the Winnebago
Home for the Aged, 237 NE2d 533, made some significant statements regarding the legal principles involved in the case before the Court, at pages 538
and 539, which are as follows:
"It is difficult to frame a universally applicable definition of an exclusively charitable
use. However, in the recent case of Methodist
Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 Ill.2d 149, 233
NE2d 537; we analyzed our past decisions concerning claimed charitable exemptions and derived from this analysis general guidelines and
standards which we have consistently applied
in passing on the merits of such claims.
"As we stated in Methodist Old People's
Home at pages 156, 157, 233 NE2d at pages
541, 542: 'It has been stated that a charity is
a gift to be applied, consistently with existing
laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of
persons, persuading them to an educational or
religious conviction, for their general welfare-or in some way reducing the burdens of government (Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 34
N.E. 467, 21 L.R.A. 454); that the distinctive
characteristics of a charitable institution are
that it has no capital, capital stock or
shareholders, earns no profits or dividends, but
rather derives its funds mainly from public and
private charity and holds them in trust for
the objects and purposes expressed in its charter,
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(People ex rel. Hellyer v. Morton, 373 Ill. 72,
25 NE2d 504; Congregational Sunday School
and Publishing Society v. Board of Review,
290 Ill. 108, 125 NE 7) ; that a charitable and
beneficient institution is one which dispenses
charity to all who need and apply for it, does
not provide gain or profit in a private sense
to any person connected with it, and does not
appear to place obstacles of any character in
the way of those who need and would avail
themselves of the charitable benefits it
dispenses. (Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis v. Board of Review, 231 Ill. 317, 88 NE
272); that the statements of the agents of an
institution and the wording of its governing
legal documents evidencing an intention to
use its property exclusively for charitable purposes do not relieve such institution of the
burden of proving that its property actually
and factually is so used. * * *"

The Court stated that it agreed with the defendant's contention that charging fees and dispensing benefits to other than those who are poverty
stricken does not cause an institution to lose its
charitable character. But it made the significant
statement that though charging fees, it dispensed
its benefits to all who needed and applied for them and
placed no obstacles in their way.

The Supreme Court further stated that the institution claiming exemption had admitted only two
people who could not pay its admission fee and,
according to the record, has allocated from its siz·
able holdings only sufficient funds to provide for
one needy applicant.
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In the Friendship Manor case before this Court,
no individual was granted assistance; no charity
was dispensed in the sense that if a person could.
not pay he would be admitted and have the use
0£ the facilities. Only those who could pay the
necessary rental required to maintain the operation
and amortization of the mortgage and all expenses
would be admitted. In the event he should be unable to continue the rental required, he would be
asked to leave.
It is inconceivable to these defendants-appellants that charity could be defined to include a person who is paying for everything that he is receiving; and the donor is giving only that which he has
paid for. This is exactly the case before the Court.
We think that the case of Friendsview Manor v.
State Tax Commission, 420 P.2d 77, is very much in point
with the case before this Honorable Court. In addition, it sets forth certain pertinent statements
which we feel point up the problems in exempting
complexes and operations such as the Friendship
Manor.
We quote for the Court's convenience:
"We will assume, without deciding, that
caring for the aging, rich or poor, is a charitable
purpose.
"The Manor reasons that if a group of
persons pays funds to a corporation to construct facilities to provide services to the same
group and the providing of such services is a
charitable work, as we are assuming it is here

1

39
because it was caring for the aging, the facilities are exempt because they are used 'exclusively in charitable work.' The Manor contends
that it is immaterial that the group that provides the funds by payment of past, present
and future founder's fees is also the group
that is receiving the benefits. This is identical
to what exists when an individual aged person
provides his own home or a group of aging
persons constructs a cooperative apartment.
The purpose in all three is providing housing
for the aging, a charitable purpose. It is not
suggested that the latter two categories also
should have tax-exempt housing.
"We conclude that the basic deficiency in
the Manor's reasoning is that it would grant
a charitable tax exemption to housing for aging
persons paid for by these same aging persons.
"If the Manor's contention is correct, the
charitable tax exemption must be granted to
many other self-help projects that provide
services which if provided to others are held to
be for charitable purposes.

"The construction of a swimming pool or
golf course can be a charitable purpose. Such
facilities benefit the community by promoting
health and teaching physical education. According to the reasoning of the plaintiff, a
group can pay its funds into a nonprofit corporation, organize as Friendsview Manor is,
have a pool or golf course built, and credit each
hour spent in the pool or a round upon the
course against the initial fee paid to construct
the facility, and the pool or golf course would
be exempt as used exclusively in a charitable
work.
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"If a donor created a trust to provide
housing for college students who would be required to pay a reasonable fee, the gift may be
held to create a charitable trust (Cf. Kappa
Gamma Rho v. Marion County, 130 Or. 165,
279 P. 555 (1929), because the housing of college students appears to be a charitable purpose. Under the taxpayer's reasoning, a fraternity corporation could be formed, a house
built with the advance payment of house bills,
and the corporation successfully claim a charitable exemption because a charitable purpose
is being served.

"The Manor reasons that the fact that
the aging persons pay for their own housing
does not destroy the charitable nature of the
Manor because we have held that hospitals
are entitled to the charitable exemption from
property tax although patients paid for the
hospital services rendered. Corporation of
Sisters af Mercy v. Lane County, 123 Or. 144,
155, 261 P. 694 (1927), etc.
"The Manor has failed to observe that
what was being paid for in our hospital decisions is completely different from what is
being paid for in the present case.
"In our hospital cases the evidence was
that the patient who was financially able,
paid for his care. There is no evidence mentioned in any of our cases that persons paid
money into a fund to build the hospital and
were promised in return that they could credit
such payments against the charges for the use
of such hospital. We know from common experience that 'charitable' hospitals are largely
built by donations from persons with no agree-
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ment for the providing of hospital care in return for the contribution. If the donors later
coincidentally happen to use the facilities of
the hospital, they will be charged at the same
rate as a nondonor. * * * "

The Oregon court made the following significant statement:
"We hold that in order to cloak property
with the charitable exemption it is essential
that the property be donated by others and
not purchased by the users of the property
in consideration for being granted such use.''
"However, the most reasonable explanation seems to be that the government exempts
such organizations from paying taxes because
if such enterprises did not exist the government would be required to use tax dollars to
do the job the charitable enterprises are now
doing."

The taxpayer's contention in this case was that
care for the elderly, whether rich or poor, was a
''charitable work" and, therefore, real property used
in carrying on such work is real property actually
and exclusively occupied or used in charitable
work.
We would like to summarize pertinent parts

of the testimony in the case before this Honorable

Court.

In this case the sponsoring churches did not
make any contribution in any manner whatsoever;

42
that as Mr. Nelson testified, there were gifts made ,
totalling $1700.00, of which Mr. Nelson, the auditor,
paid $500.00 and Mr. Stewart, the attorney, paid
$300.00. That the $25,000.00 necessary to be set up
as capital by the Federal Housing Administration
was loaned to the plaintiff herein by Chuckrow ,
Construction Company, who was awarded the construction on an odd bid basis. The money was not
required to be repaid prior to November 22, 2005 ·
(Tr. 457, 458).
Under Federal Housing Administration regulations, twenty percent of the total number of apartments or rooms could be rented to people who
were under the age of 62 years (Tr. 377, 378). The
applicant, upon being accepted for tenancy, was
required to pay the first and last months' rentai
(Tr. 369, 370). Applicant was required to put up the '
cost of one meal over a 30-day calendar month, in
advance. An extra charge was made in the sum of
$10.00 for a unit that had a balcony (Tr. 372. The
charge for rental varied in accordance .with the
height of the apartment, each floor be in g advanced $1.00 per floor, plus _the basic rental figure
(Tr. 373).
There was no policy of the plaintiff to limit tenancy to any particular class of people as pertained
to their financial worth. A tenant must be ambula
tory; financially able to maintain his rent as well as
to take care of himself (Tr. 377). Plaintiff was not in a
position to accept tenants who were not able to pay

their obligations and maintain the standards of living which are required in Friendship Manor (Tr.
378). Frendship Manor was never intended to be a
rest home or a convalescent home (Tr. 381). If the
tenant could not pay his rent he would no doubt
be asked to leave (Tr. 380). All help in the operation
or maintenance of Friendship Manor, including office help, is paid (Tr. 384. The building or premises
is being paid by payments on the mortgage. At the
end of the payment of the note, the building is paid
and the land is free and clear (Tr. 477). The amount
of rent scheduled for
is for the purpose
of meeting all expenses, amortization of interest,
and principal. If for any reason there was an increase in the cost of operation, such as taxes, this
would have to be· met by increasing rentals (Tr.
496, 497).
Ten individuals, who were tenants in Friendship Manor, testified that their incomes were $5,000
to $11,000 per year. The eleventh tenant was known
to be affluent. (Tr. 541, 542, 543, 544, 560, 561,
562, 563, 64, 567, 568, 570, 571, 572, 583, 584 and 585).
Friendship Manor is in direct competition with
the Newhouse Hotel, and other taxpaying units rendering the same service as Friendship Manor. Newhouse Hotel's facilities are . just as i:-roficient and
elaborate as those of the plaintiff-respondent; it is
Paying its share of taxes and bearing its proportion
of the public burden, whereas, the plaintiff-respondent, Friendship Manor, is operating tax-free, and its
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proportion of the public burden is being born by
the taxpayers.
In the case of Odd Fellows' Bldg. Ass'n v. Naylor,
supra, the Utah Court conceded that the owners of
property, to be exempt within the purview of the
Constitution, are not limited to ecclesiastical or
charitable organizations, but the exemption privilege
is extended, without regard to the character of its owner.
Therefore, if the Trial Court is sustained, individuals or a corporation may form a nonprofit corportion and be eligible for the tax exemption if the
use to which the property is put comes within the
principles enunciated by the Trial Court.
These principles are contained in the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Trial Court
(Tr. 314-321); they provide that Friendship Manor
was designed and constructed as a facility for the
housing, maintenance and well-being of elderly
persons (anyone 62 years of age or older qualifies
as elderly). (Parenthesized portion ours.) Further, that
Friendship Manor had been operated in such a way
as to provide elderly persons (62 years of age or
over) an environment in which they can live with
other elderly people, receiving the advantage of
"media therapy", participate in hobbies, and generally extended the useful and interesting periods
of their lives. (Parenthesized portion ours.) Further, that
many can still live useful and interesting lives if
given the proper circumstances to live under. The
Court concluded that these purposes are charitable
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within the meaning of that term as provided for in
Article XIII, Utah Constitution, and Section 59-2-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
The Trial Court concluded in pc:ragraph 2 of
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Tr.
320) as follows:
"Unlike in pioneer days, today the descendants of our senior citizens do not, and in
all probability in most cases, cannot, give the
care and attention to our elders that they need
and which our society as a whole would like to
see them receive. Undoubtedly, a large percentage of our retired citizens are still capable of
largely caring for themselves, particularly when
they are not left completely alone and forgotten. Many can still live useful and interesting
lives given the proper circumstances to live under. The establishment of centers such as
Friendship Manor (with its non-profit background) makes available to them such circumstances. T h e s e purposes are charitable
within the meaning of that term as provided
for in Article XIII, Utah Constitution, and
Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended."

The fact situation in this case, which the Trial
Court held constitutes use, exclusively for charitable
purposes within the meaning of the Constitution
and the Utah Code, if sustained, would lead to great
abuse. Great numbers of tax-free apartment houses
would undobutedly come into existence, not bearing their proportion of the tax burden.
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It is difficult for us to believe that the framers ,
of the Constitution of the state of Utah intended that
anyone attaining the age of 62 years, regardless oi
his financial needs, ipso facto should be accorded
tax-free housing. The various benefits accorded
tenants at Friendship Manor are avaiiable, or can
be easily made available, in other housing complexes.

Under the Trial Court's ruling it seems to us
there is nothing to prevent a nonprofit corporation
being formed by individuals building elaborate
apartment units, restricting their occupancy to anyone over 62 years, notwithstanding that the tenants
would be of substantial means and able to afford
elaborate apartments, charging suMicient rent to pay
all expenses and amortization of mortgages, and be
tax-free. These units or apartments would not bear
their proportion of the tax burden, which pays for
the services now necessary to maintain our society.
As was stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon
in the case of Friendsview Manor v. State Tax Commission,
supra, what would prevent a group in forming J.
nonprofit organization, paying its funds into such
organization, and having a pool or gol± course built
and credit each hour spent in the pool or a round
upon the course, against the initial fee paid to construct the facilities, and the pool or golf course
would be exempt as used exclusively in a charitable work.
The Oregon court further stated that the con-
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struction of a swimming pool or golf course can be
a charitable purpose. Such facilities benefit the
community by promoting health and teaching physical education.
The Trial Court's reasoning in the case before
this Honorable Court would lead and open the
gates to a myriad of situations of tax-free operations
which were never contemplated by the framers of
the Utah Constitution.
It seems to us that it is fundamental that in order to cloak property with a charitable exemption
it is essential that the property be donated by others
and not purchased by the users of the property in
consideration for being granted such use. In other
words, the factual situation in the case before this
Court is that the users of the property are paying
an amount sufficient to purchase the property for
the nonprofit corporation.

Further, it seems fundamental to us that the
framers of the Constitution of Utah intended that
the exemption in the payment of tax, and bearing
the just proportion o£ the tax burden, should only
be applied to those enterprises that if they did not
exist the government would be required to use tax
dollars to do the job the charitable enterprises were
doing.
What would prevent the construction of a complex limiting its apartments to elaborate types;
limited to those who have reached the age of 62;
limited to those of substantial income and wealth,
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further, with facilities such as a golf course, bow'.ing alley, swimming pool; all tax-free.
The principles enunciated by the Trial Court
would permit churches and other organizations to
form nonprofit corporations, without any contribution by them, by constructing apartment units;
limiting tenancy to those of 62 or over; providing
for all types of recreational activities; the· tenants
paying all costs, including maintenance, payments
of mortgage; and the tax burden being shifted to
others.
The basic deficiency in the Trial Court's reasoning is that it would grant a charitable tax exemption to apartments that are occupied by persons 62
years of age or over (Tr. 304, 305). No qualifications·
are applied. Any apartment occupied by a person
reaching the magic age of 62 qualHies the apartment for a charitable tax exemption. The basic rent
and every sevrice rendered by Friendship Manor
is paid for by its tenants. If they do not pay, they
must leave. The tenants may be millionaires or of
substantial means and in excellent health, but
the fact they have attained the age of 62, the apartments they occupy would automatically meet
the standards qualifying for the charitable tax exemption; the age of 62 being the determining factor. We say that this is judicial legislation on the
part of the Trial Court. It is our contention that the
Trial .Court, in arbitrarily qualifying apartments occupied by persons 62 years of age or over, for
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charitable tax exemption, has achieved judicial legislation. It is fundamental that this cannot be done.
As we interpret the Trial Court's Judgment and Decree, all that is required for an apartment to be
exempt for tax purposes is that the tenant has attained the age of 62 years ofi age.
If a tenant in the calendar year 1970 is 61 years
of age, his apartment is not exempt for tax purposes;
but upon his attaining the age of 62 on January 1,
1971, the apartment would automatically then be
exempt for tax purposes because the occupant attained the age of 62.

The County Assessor of Salt Lake County would
be required, immediately after the first day of January of each calendar year, to determine what
apartments or units were occupied by persons 62
years of age or over. !£ the occupant were 62 years
of age or over, the apartment would be qulified. for
charitable tax exemption. If he were 61 years of age
or younger, or not handicapped (whatever that
means), the apartment would not be qualified. for
charitable tax exemption
Because of the great progress made by medical
science in increasing the life expectancy as well
as the wellbeing of people today, we find great
numbers of people who have attained the age of
62 years in good health and with substantial means.
Could it be said that the framers of the Constitution of the State of Utah, as well as 1he Legislators
in implementing the provisions of the Constitution

50
of the State of Utah pertaining to charitable tax exempions, intended such interpretation as that found
by the Trial Court.
It must be remembered that the tenant must
pay for all services rendered, including extra for a
balcony and extra for the height of the floor desired.
We emphatically contend that under no stretch
of the imagination could the Constitution of Utah
and the laws implementing the same be so construed and interpreted to sustain the Trial Courts
Judgment and Decree.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit to this Honorable Court
that the Trial Court erred, and that this case should
be remanded to the Trial Court, directing it to make
and enter its order that the property of plaintiffrespondent, from the factual situations in this case,
be placed upon the tax rolls of Salt Lake County as
nonexempt property.
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